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Introduction
A formidable number of  complex issues will need to be resolved 
if  a new global agreement on climate change is to be reached 
to cover the years immediately following the expiry of  the 
first commitment (or ‘compliance’) period under the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2012.1 With little doubt, the most contentious 
issue will be how to allocate the burden of  reducing global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In short, there is a need 
for a fair sharing of  the ‘effort’ between countries. But what 
is fair? What principles and considerations are relevant? And 
how should such principles and considerations be weighted?
The broad framework for a post-2012 agreement 
was established, after intensive negotiations, at the 13th 
conference of  the parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Bali in mid-
December 2007 (COP 13). Under the Bali Action Plan or 
‘Roadmap’ (as embodied in the terms of  reference of  the 
ad hoc working group on long-term cooperative action) the 
parties agreed, amongst other things, to undertake:
 Enhanced national/international action on mitigation of  
climate change, including, inter alia, consideration of:
 Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally 
appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including 
quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, 
by all developed country Parties, while ensuring the 
comparability of  efforts among them, taking into account 
differences in their national circumstances;
 Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing 
country Parties in the context of  sustainable development, 
supported and enabled by technology, financing and 
capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and 
verifiable manner. (UNFCCC, 2007, paragraphs 1, (b)(i) 
and (b)(ii))
Both the meaning of  these paragraphs and their 
implications for the nature of  any new climate change 
agreement have been the subject of  much debate within the 
international community since late 2007. A particular focus 
of  attention has been the rationale for, and the meaning and 
implications of, the clause ‘while ensuring the comparability 
of  efforts among them’. This clause has not hitherto been 
included in international climate change agreements and its 
meaning has yet to be clarified.2 Potentially, however, these 
apparently bland eight words could be crucial to the framing 
of  a post-2012 agreement. After all, words matter, and some 
words pack a large punch. 
Accordingly, this short article explores the possible 
interpretations and applications of  ‘comparability of  efforts’. 
First, it comments briefly on the reasons for the inclusion 
of  this phrase in the Bali Action Plan, including why it is 
applied solely to developed countries. Second, it explores the 
meaning of  the words ‘comparability’ and ‘efforts’, and thus 
the possible interpretations of  the phrase ‘comparability 
of  efforts’ (or ‘comparable effort’). Third, consideration is 
given to what the parties at the Bali conference thought they 
were agreeing to by including the notion of  ‘comparability 
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of  efforts’. Fourth, the article examines how the phrase 
has been interpreted since Bali and how it relates to well-
established principles of  justice. Finally, I examine the 
possible significance of  the inclusion of  this phase in the Bali 
Action Plan and how it might be applied in the context of  a 
post-2012 agreement.
Why ‘comparability of efforts’?
The inclusion of  the clause ‘while ensuring the comparability 
of  efforts among them’ in paragraph 1(b)(i) of  the Bali Action 
Plan reflected the unwillingness of  some developed countries, 
most notably the United States, to accept the need for all 
Annex 1 parties to take on internationally-binding quantified 
emission limitation and reduction objectives (i.e. Kyoto-type 
‘responsibility’ targets or ‘commitments’) during the immediate 
post-2012 period. Instead, the United States was only prepared 
to endorse something weaker and less demanding, namely 
‘actions’; hence the inclusion of  both ‘commitments or actions’ 
in paragraph 1(b)(i). Bear in mind that the United States is 
alone amongst Annex 1 countries in not having ratified the 
Kyoto Protocol; it is thus not bound by the ‘responsibility’ 
targets for the first commitment period (2008–12) in Annex B 
of  the Protocol and is not part of  the Kyoto 
cap-and-trade system.
What precisely is meant by ‘actions’ is 
not spelled out in the relevant paragraphs 
of  the Bali Action Plan, but it is reasonable 
to assume that ‘actions’ refers to a wide 
range of  possible policies and measures 
designed to reduce GHG emissions, with 
the explicit exception of  time-specific, 
internationally-binding emission reduction 
targets.  Examples of  such policies and 
measures include domestic carbon taxes 
or emissions trading schemes, targets 
for renewable energy production, biofuels targets, energy 
efficiency targets, intensity targets, and policies and measures 
to reduce deforestation and agricultural emissions. They 
might also include policies and measures designed to assist 
other countries to reduce emissions, via technology transfers, 
financing and research and development.
From a negotiating perspective, the unwillingness of  a 
single significant Annex 1 party to take on internationally-
binding, Kyoto-type targets for a second commitment 
period poses a serious dilemma for the global community. 
If  a large emitter, like the United States, is not prepared 
to commit to binding emission reductions, the political 
incentives (and probably also the economic incentives) for 
other developed countries to take on stringent responsibility 
targets will necessarily be weakened. After all, the exclusion 
of  a major developed country runs the risk of  undermining 
the environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency 
of  any new climate change agreement while at the same 
time making it much harder for political leaders across the 
developed world to secure the support of  their legislatures 
and electorates for domestic action to mitigate climate change 
(see Garnaut, 2008a, 2008b). In short, when collective action 
is a prerequisite for successful policy action, free-riding by a 
significant player poses huge policy risks. 
It is these considerations that prompted the parties at 
COP 13 in Bali to seek the inclusion of  the words ‘while 
ensuring the comparability of  efforts among them’. In a 
context where the United States, as the largest emitter in 
the developed world, was only willing to undertake ‘actions’ 
rather than ‘commitments’ beyond 2012 the other parties 
wanted to ensure that any actions by the United States to 
reduce its domestic emissions would, in aggregate, be sufficient 
to render any new agreement environmentally effective, 
broadly equitable and politically feasible. In effect, therefore, 
the United States would need to commit in some credible 
way to implementing a series of  domestic (and international) 
measures during a second commitment period (whether 
under Kyoto or a new protocol) that would be seen by the 
rest of  the world as constituting a fair share of  the global 
mitigation burden. Put differently, a new, environmentally 
effective global agreement may not be politically feasible 
unless the United States is prepared to implement explicit 
measures that are broadly similar in nature, scope and scale 
to the ‘commitments’ – in the form of  internationally-binding 
responsibility targets – being taken on by other developed 
countries (or at least the overwhelming majority of  developed 
countries). The words ‘comparability of  efforts’ sought to 
give expression to this notion. Had the United States been 
prepared to take on ‘commitments’ rather than ‘actions’, the 
phrase ‘comparability of  efforts’ (or similar wording) may 
not have formed part of  the Bali Action Plan.
Four other points are worth noting briefly at this 
juncture. First, while the phrase ‘comparability of  efforts’ (or 
‘comparable effort’) has not previously been incorporated 
into an international climate change document, such as 
the Bali Action Plan, similar wording has been used in the 
international climate change context for some years. For 
instance, Ashton and Wang (2003) identify ‘comparability of  
effort’ (note the singular ‘effort’ rather than the plural ‘efforts’) 
as one of  ‘five dimensions’ of  equity in a collection of  essays 
on post-2012 arrangements published by the Pew Center. 
They interpret the phrase to mean that those countries ‘with 
similar circumstances should undertake a similar degree of  
effort’ and note that this links to other dimensions of  equity, 
a new, environmentally effective global 
agreement may not be politically feasible unless 
the United States is prepared to implement 
explicit measures that are broadly similar in 
nature, scope and scale to the ‘commitments’
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most notably the ‘capacity’ to act (or relative wealth). This 
point will be discussed below.
Second, the clause ‘while ensuring the comparability of  
efforts among them’ applies only to developed countries; 
it is not included in paragraph 1(b)(ii). Hence, developing 
countries are excluded. The reason for this is that a number 
of  large emerging economies opposed the inclusion of  these 
words in paragraph 1(b)(ii) because of  the possible implication 
that some developing countries (i.e. those with relatively high 
per capita incomes and/or high per capita emissions) should 
do more than others. At some stage, however, differentiation 
between the burdens accepted by developing countries to limit, 
and ultimately reduce, their emissions will be necessary, and 
such differentiation will need to be based on well-established 
principles – above all, principles of  distributive justice. If  the 
clause relating to ‘comparability of  efforts’ were to prove 
helpful in fashioning an acceptable post-2012 agreement, at 
least in relation to the roles of  developed countries, it is likely 
that pressure will grow for the application of  this provision to 
developing countries in a future climate change deal.
Third, the inclusion of  the word ‘actions’ in paragraph 
1(b)(i) constitutes a significant weakening of  the Kyoto policy 
framework, under which all Annex 1 parties were expected 
to take on internationally binding ‘commitments’. Put 
bluntly, there is a risk that the policy measures agreed for a 
second commitment period will be even less environmentally 
effective. Further, if  the United States insists on taking 
‘actions’ rather than making ‘commitments’, other developed 
countries (e.g. Canada, Japan and Russia) may seek to follow 
suit. In these circumstances, the global policy framework for 
addressing climate change, patiently crafted over the years 
1992–2005, would be put at risk.
Fourth, the inclusion of  the word ‘efforts’ in paragraph 
1(b)(i) has been seen by some observers as constituting another 
departure from, and weakening of, the Kyoto framework. 
This is because ‘efforts’ can be interpreted to mean merely 
striving towards a goal rather than the actual achievement of  
desired results or outcomes. I will consider this point further 
below. 
Defining ‘comparability of efforts’
In order to explore the possible meanings of  ‘comparability 
of  efforts’, it is helpful to examine what is meant by 
‘comparability’ and ‘efforts’. According to the Oxford English 
Dictionary, the word ‘comparability’ has Latin roots (comparo) 
and is closely linked to the words ‘compare’, ‘comparable’, 
‘comparative’, and ‘comparison’. The prefix ‘com’ (or cum 
in Latin) means ‘with’, ‘together’ or ‘jointly’, while the Latin 
word par refers to ‘equality’ or ‘likeness’.
Accordingly, ‘comparability’ embraces a number of  ideas. 
The first is the notion that two or more things (e.g. items, 
objects, ideas, etc.) are capable of  being compared; that is, 
they have qualities that render it possible for meaningful 
comparisons to be drawn between them. Such qualities 
could include, for instance, matters of  size or magnitude (e.g. 
scope, scale, density, weight, etc.) or matters of  value (e.g. 
beauty, moral worth, monetary value, etc.). The second is 
the notion that the things being compared are not merely 
capable of  comparison, but are also actually comparable; that 
is, they are alike or similar in some relevant respect. For 
instance, they might be of  similar size or weight, or similar 
value or worth, or of  a similar standard or quality. Similar, 
in this context, does not necessarily mean exactly the same, 
identical or equal in some crucial respect. Nevertheless, as 
noted above, the Latin word par also means 
equal, so in many situations referring to 
objects as being comparable may well imply that 
they are equal, if  not in every respect, then at 
least in some relevant way. Thus, we might 
say that two essays are of  a comparable standard, 
by which we would mean that they were not 
merely capable of  being compared but they 
are also of  a broadly equal standard or very 
similar in quality. In the policy sphere, the 
word ‘comparability’ is employed in a variety 
of  contexts, most notably industrial relations 
(e.g. pay comparability) and in relation to statistics (i.e. data 
comparability).
The noun ‘effort’ (and the plural ‘efforts’) derives from 
the Latin prefix ex-, which means ‘out’, and fortis, meaning 
‘strong’ or ‘force’. In the contemporary context, making an 
effort is generally thought to mean an earnest, vigorous or 
strenuous attempt or an activity being undertaken by exertion 
or hard work, whether physical or intellectual. Hence, we 
talk about people making an effort (or efforts) to complete 
a task, or perhaps failing to make the necessary effort. But 
‘effort’ can also refer to an achievement or accomplishment. 
For instance, we might say that a particular book was the 
author’s best effort thus far or that a person’s efforts were not 
in vain. In both cases, we would be implying that something 
had been achieved – i.e. there had been more than a mere 
expenditure of  effort with nothing to show for it. 
Nevertheless, when the word ‘effort’ is invoked the most 
likely implication is that something is in process (or that work 
is being undertaken or an attempt is being made), rather than 
that a worthy result or positive outcome has been, or will be, 
achieved. Indeed, in the discourse on social (or distributive) 
justice, the principle of  effort is typically distinguished from 
other desert-based principles, such as merit (or achievement) 
or contribution (see Feinberg, 1973, pp.112-17). Hence, if  
when the word ‘effort’ is invoked the most 
likely implication is that something is in process 
..., rather than that a worthy result or positive 
outcome has been, or will be, achieved.
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we decided to reward people for their effort, as opposed to 
their effective contribution, we would be seeking to assess how 
hard they had worked rather than what they had actually 
produced as a result of  their labours. For various reasons, 
attempts to measure the amount of  exertion, and thereby 
assess the relative effort made by different people, can be 
very difficult.
What do these varying definitions imply for the meaning 
of  the clause ‘while ensuring the comparability of  efforts 
among them’? First, it is evident that the clause is open to a 
number of  possible meanings, depending on how the words 
‘comparability’ and ‘efforts’ are interpreted. With the various 
definitions in mind, as discussed above, there are at least six 
possible options (see Table 1). A minimalist interpretation of  
the clause would be that any expenditure of  effort (or efforts) 
by developed countries to reduce their GHG emissions must 
be amenable to meaningful comparisons, but nothing more. 
There would be no requirement to ensure that the efforts 
in question were similar or equal in some respect, or that 
they actually produced the desired results. Against this, a 
maximalist interpretation would be that any agreed efforts 
by developed countries to reduce their emissions must be 
equal (or equivalent) in some relevant respect, and that this 
equality refers to a desired end state (or outcome) rather than 
merely the equal exertion of  effort (somehow measured). 
Between the minimalist and maximalist interpretations there 
are four other possibilities, as shown in Table 1.
Bear in mind that the six options identified in Table 1 
are essentially high-level or conceptual in nature. Within 
each option it would be possible to identify a range of  
practical ways in which the parties to the UNFCCC could 
give expression to the quest for ‘comparability of  efforts’. As 
discussed later, for instance, there are many ways in which 
the notion of  equal effort might be applied.
What did the parties mean by ‘comparability of efforts’?
It is not entirely clear what each of  the parties involved in 
drafting the Bali Action Plan thought they were agreeing 
to when they supported the inclusion of  the clause ‘while 
ensuring the comparability of  efforts among them’. The 
evidence suggests, however, that different parties may 
well have understood the clause in different ways. While 
it is doubtful that either the minimalist or maximalist 
interpretations drew much support, it is equally probable that 
there was no clear majority for any one of  the other possible 
broad interpretations – to the extent that these options were 
actually identified and discussed. 
In all probability, the clause only proved so widely 
acceptable because it is relatively ambiguous and thus 
open to a range of  different (and potentially equally valid) 
interpretations. Had there been an attempt to define (or 
narrow the possible range of  definitions of) the clause at COP 
13, it might well have died a quick death. At the same time, 
the choice of  the word ‘efforts’ over, say, ‘results’ was no doubt 
viewed by many of  the parties and observers as a deliberate 
and intentional weakening of  the Kyoto framework, in the 
sense that it opened up the possibility of  developed countries 
undertaking ‘actions’ (as opposed to ‘commitments’) 
that could be judged (somehow) on the basis of  the effort 
expended rather than the outcomes achieved. It is also likely 
that few of  the parties interpreted comparability to mean equal, 
not least because the notion of  equality sits uncomfortably 
with the construction of  the relevant paragraph in the Bali 
Action Plan – which concludes ‘… comparability of  efforts 
among them, taking into account differences in their national 
circumstances’. If  ‘national circumstances’ are to be given 
weight, then strict equality (or any kind) is not an option. 
In any event, to the extent that some of  the negotiators had 
equality (rather than, say, similarity) in mind, they would have 
been aware of  the many possible forms of  equality (e.g. equal 
percentage emission reductions by all developed countries, 
equal per capita emission reductions, etc.).
To the extent that the parties had any common 
understanding of  the clause it is likely that they interpreted it 
to mean that all developed countries (including any that chose 
not to ratify a new climate change agreement) should ‘pull 
their weight’ and make a ‘fair contribution’ to the collective 
endeavour to reduce emissions. In other words, free-riding 
would not be acceptable, whether ethically, environmentally 
or politically. Similarly, it was probably envisaged – and 
this is certainly captured by the use of  the plural efforts, 
as opposed to the singular effort – that any agreed actions 
and commitments should be viewed holistically. That is to 
say, in comparing the various policy measures being taken 
by countries to mitigate climate change during a second 
commitment period (including internationally-binding and 
non-binding measures) it would be important to consider the 
measures in question as a total package. The question would 
not simply be whether this particular target for this particular 
country was fair, but whether the particular packages of  
commitments and/or actions by particular countries were 
Table 1: Possible interpretations of ‘comparability of efforts’ in 
relation to mitigating climate change
The meaning of comparability
The 
meaning 
of efforts
Able to be 
compared
Similar/alike Equal/
equivalence
Expenditure 
of effort 
to reduce 
emissions
The efforts 
of the parties 
are able to 
be compared
The efforts 
of the parties 
are similar 
(on some 
relevant 
dimension)
The efforts 
of the parties 
are equal 
(on some 
relevant 
dimension)
Achieving 
a result, in 
terms of 
reduced 
emissions
The efforts 
of the parties 
achieve 
results that 
are able to 
be compared
The parties 
achieve 
similar 
results 
(on some 
relevant 
dimension)
The parties 
achieve 
equal results 
(on some 
relevant 
dimension)
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fair relative to the packages of  measures being taken by 
others.
How, then, should ‘comparability of efforts’ be interpreted and 
applied?
Since COP 13 in Bali, various contributions have been 
made to the debate over how the clause ‘while ensuring the 
comparability of  efforts among them’ should be interpreted 
(e.g. see Helme, 2008; Schmidt et al., 2008). Not surprisingly, 
it has been suggested that the clause means ‘equal treatment 
of  equal countries’ or that ‘countries in similar circumstances 
should make similar contributions’ (Schmidt et al., 2008). 
Such an approach resonates with the Aristotelian principle 
of  comparative justice, also known as the principle of  like 
treatment. This states that like cases should be treated alike 
and different cases differently, in direct proportion to the 
differences (or inequalities) between them (Feinberg, 1973, 
pp.99-100). This principle is reflected in the more modern 
conceptions of  vertical and horizontal equity which hold 
that those who are the same in all morally relevant ways 
should be treated the same while those who are different in 
some morally relevant manner should be treated differently 
(Miller, 1976).
But while the principle of  like treatment has significant 
merit and, indeed, wide appeal, it is entirely formal (or 
formalistic) in nature. It merely tells us to treat like cases 
(or countries) alike; it does not supply a basis upon which 
to decide the relevant kind or degree of  alikeness; nor does 
it provide guidance on how we should vary our treatment 
to reflect different kinds or degrees of  unalikeness (i.e. how 
the principle of  proportionality should be applied). In order 
to give the principle real content, and thus enable it to be 
applied meaningfully in a particular context, it must be 
supplemented with material principles of  justice. That is to say, 
we need criteria for determining whether something is alike 
or not and which differences are relevant. In terms of  climate 
change mitigation by developed countries, the relevant issues 
are: what criteria (or material principles) should be used 
for making inter-country comparisons, how should such 
criteria be weighted and applied, and how should relevant 
differences between countries (i.e. ‘national circumstances’) 
be taken into account? 
There are two related steps in addressing this issue, one 
largely procedural, the other distributive. From a procedural 
perspective, as noted earlier, ‘comparability of  efforts’ implies 
that any efforts must be measurable against one another. 
For example, it might require that all developed countries 
measure their emission reductions from a given base year, use 
a common metric (e.g. the same Global Warming Potentials), 
or embrace common targets (e.g. national or sectoral). In this 
sense, the inclusion of  ‘comparability of  efforts’ in the Bali 
Action Plan reinforces the requirement (earlier in the same 
paragraph) for ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable … 
commitments or actions’ and sets a limit on the variability of  
commitments and/or actions that developed countries can 
take; only those policies that can be meaningfully measured 
and compared can be included. Plainly, this limits the 
flexibility that countries have in choosing the nature of  their 
‘efforts’ (whether these be internationally-binding or not). 
For example, without this constraint, countries could readily 
commit to, say, funding new research on clean technologies 
in place of  making emission reductions. In 
practice, however, it is likely to be difficult to 
measure the efficacy of  such research efforts 
or compare them meaningfully to the impact 
of  emission reductions.
From a distributive perspective, criteria 
are needed to determine when two (or more) 
countries are similar (or alike) and when 
they are not. In relation to climate change, 
a number of  material principles have been 
suggested over the years, including equality, 
historical responsibility (or contribution to the problem), 
capacity (or wealth), need (or basic needs), welfare costs and 
monetary costs (see Ashton and Wang, 2003; Kengmana 
and Boston, 2008). There is not the space here to explore 
such principles in detail, but it is important to note that there 
is no consensus, within either the scholarly or diplomatic 
communities, on their relative importance. There is, however, 
reasonable widespread support for the principle of  equality – 
in the sense that each person, irrespective of  their nationality, 
should have an equal right to emit GHGs and hence that 
all countries should (at some point in the future) receive 
equal per capita emission allowances, provided there are no 
offsetting considerations. This principle, incidentally, provides 
the primary basis for the proposal known as ‘contraction 
and convergence’ (see Kengmana and Boston, 2008). It also 
underpins the argument expounded by the Garnaut Climate 
Change Review that there should be a gradual convergence, 
covering all countries, to equal per capita allocations by 
around 2050 (see below, and Garnaut et al. in this issue of  
PQ). 
If  the goal were to equalise efforts between developed 
countries, how might this be achieved and what metrics 
should be employed? There are a variety of  ways of  
approaching such issues. For instance, Schmidt et al. (2008)3 
distinguish between two broad ways of  conceptualising 
comparability and applying notions of  equality to climate 
change mitigation (see Figure 1). On the one hand, countries 
could contribute comparable inputs towards the objective of  
reducing emissions – that is, inputs such as costs could be 
... the Garnaut Review suggests that emissions 
allocations per capita should be equalised by 
2050, with the process commencing in 2013 
and taking a relatively linear path.
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of  a comparable size;4 on the other hand, countries could 
take on ‘commitments’ or ‘actions’ with the aim of  achieving 
comparable end-points or outcomes.5 Since countries face 
different environmental and economic conditions and these 
have impacts on the efficacy of  inputs, contributing equal 
inputs need not lead to achieving equal outputs. Likewise, 
committing to equal outcomes does not imply that countries 
will face equal costs in achieving these targets. 
As highlighted in Figure 1, there are a variety of  ways 
in which ‘equal inputs’ and ‘equal outcomes’ (or ‘end-
points’) could be interpreted. A detailed analysis of  each of  
these options, and their related metrics and implications, is 
beyond the scope of  this article. But various points are worth 
highlighting. First, some of  the suggested options are not 
mutually exclusive. A combination is thus possible (and might 
indeed be preferable). Second, most of  the suggested end-
points would not be possible to achieve by the end of  the next 
commitment period (e.g. 2020). In these circumstances, some 
form of  agreed milestones would be required. Third, the 
different options imply significantly different emissions paths 
for Annex 1 countries during the next commitment period. 
This is bound to colour the attitudes of  the respective parties 
to the relative merits of  such options. Fourth, while each of  
these approaches has potential advantages and disadvantages, 
some are clearly more problematic (and controversial) than 
others (e.g. because of  data limitations or the implications for 
how the mitigation burden would be shared).
Quite apart from this, there is the question of  how the 
application of  the concept of  ‘comparability of  efforts’ during 
a second commitment period might relate to the longer-term 
quest for large global emissions reductions (e.g. 50–85% 
below 2000 levels by 2050). It will be important, for example, 
that whatever is agreed in relation to a second commitment 
period is broadly consistent with longer-term policy goals, 
both in relation to an overall stabilisation objective for GHG 
concentrations (and the emissions reductions required to 
achieve this objective) and the respective contributions of  
the various parties to achieving the agreed stabilisation goal. 
With this in mind, let us suppose that, subject to certain 
provisos, the concept of  comparable effort is taken to be 
consistent with the view that the entitlements of  countries to 
emit GHGs should be linked increasingly to the respective 
size of  their populations, with an eventual policy framework 
based on the principle of  equal per capita allocations (i.e. 
emission rights would be equalised on a per capita basis). 
Let us also assume that emission rights will be tradable and 
thus actual emissions per capita will vary – depending, for 
instance, on the relative wealth and economic structures of  
different countries. 
What might such an approach mean for different 
countries? The proposals in the supplementary draft report 
of  the Garnaut Climate Change Review (Garnaut, 2008b) 
provide some possible answers. Specifically, the Garnaut 
Review suggests that emissions allocations per capita should 
be equalised by 2050, with the process commencing in 2013 
and taking a relatively linear path. It also suggests two possible 
stabilisation targets – 450 and 550 parts per million (ppm) 
CO2 equivalent. Tables 2 and 3 summarise the magnitude 
of  the emissions reductions required (relative to 2001 levels) 
to achieve such targets, first in relation to total emissions per 
country and second in per capita terms. They also include 
target reductions for 2020 – a possible date for the end of  the 
second commitment period (assuming there is one). 
In terms of  parameters, the Garnaut Review assumes 
that emissions were 35.3 GtCO2 equivalent in 2001. With 
the global population being approximately 6.15 billion at this 
time, emissions were about 5.74 tonnes per capita. Mid-range 
projections point to the global population reaching about 9 
Figure 1: Equal inputs versus equal outcomes 
• Equal % reduction from a base year
• Equal % reduction from a reference 
scenario
• Equal abatement costs
• Equal marginal abatement costs
• Equal total abatement costs per 
unit of CO2e reduced
• Equal total abatement costs per 
unit of GDP
• Equal total abatement costs per 
capita
• Equal macroeconomic effort    
• Equal emissions (or emission rights) 
per capita at an end point
• Equal levels of efficiency per sector 
• Equal emissions intensity for the 
whole economy (GHG/GDP) 
• Multi-criteria approach based on a 
combination of measures (e.g. 
energy efficiency, equity and ability to 
pay)   
Environmental and 
economic factors
Equal outcomes or endpoints 
(possible indicators)  
Equal inputs
(possible indicators)  
Source: Primarily derived from Schmidt et al. (2008) 
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billion in 2050. Hence, if  aggregate global emissions are to 
be cut by 50% by 2050 (probably the bare minimum required 
to meet the lower stabilisation target of  450ppm), per capita 
emissions will need to fall by 66% (to about 1.95 tonnes).
Three matters deserve particular mention. First, the 
decision as to whether population growth projections should 
be included or excluded in assessments of  ‘comparable effort’ 
will have substantial implications for individual countries – 
and thus their respective post-2012 mitigation burdens. The 
ramifications for countries where rapid population growth is 
likely (e.g. India) are particularly significant. Second, on a per 
capita basis, the emissions reductions required by developed 
countries by 2050 to meet both stabilisation targets are very 
large. But interestingly, the magnitude of  the reductions does 
not vary greatly across the developed world. The situation 
is rather different, however, for the target date of  2020. For 
instance, to meet the lower of  the two targets (i.e. 450ppm), 
Canada would need to reduce its emissions per capita by 
around 54% (or 45% overall), whereas the equivalent figures 
for the EU25 are 33% and 30%. Third, neither of  the two 
stabilisation targets can be achieved without reductions 
(relative to 2001 levels) by developing countries on a per capita 
basis. Moreover, to meet the lower of  the two targets, China 
will need to make substantial reductions on 2001 levels, and 
this implies even greater cuts relative to current emissions 
levels (given the rapid growth of  emissions in recent years). 
Put bluntly, this means that any attempt to limit the notion of  
‘comparable effort’ (and related considerations of  distributive 
justice) to developed countries is misplaced.
The Garnaut Review does not include New Zealand in 
its analysis. However, the emissions reductions required (in 
both aggregate and per capita terms) are relatively easy to 
calculate, at least for 2050.6 To achieve the lower stabilisation 
target, per capita emissions will need to fall from about 18.8 
tonnes per capita in 2001 to 1.95 tonnes in 2050, a reduction 
of  89.6%.7 This is slightly less than the corresponding figures 
for Canada and the US, but greater than for the EU25 
and Japan. The aggregate reductions required (86.7%) 
are less than in per capita terms, but roughly comparable 
to the developed world average. For the higher stabilisation 
target, New Zealand’s per capita emissions would need to 
fall by 81.9%, slightly above the developed world average. 
Bear in mind that such figures reflect the likely allocation 
of  rights to emit in the context where rights per capita are 
equalised globally by 2050. Assuming that such rights can be 
traded across national borders, actual per capita emissions 
will continue to vary between countries – although almost 
certainly much less than now.  
Conclusion
This article has briefly explored the possible meaning and 
implications of  a key clause in the Bali Action Plan: ‘while 
ensuring the comparability of  efforts among them’. I have 
argued that the clause is ambiguous and open-ended, and 
that the concept of  ‘comparable effort’ constitutes a formal 
rather than a material principle. As such, it lacks agreed, 
substantive content – other than the minimalist notion that 
any efforts (whatever form they might take) must be capable 
of  comparison. This underscores the requirement (elsewhere 
in the relevant paragraph of  the Bali Action Plan) for the 
‘mitigation commitments or actions’ of  developed countries 
to be ‘measurable, reportable and verifiable’, but it probably 
does not add a new, distinctive requirement. 
The clause’s open-ended nature, of  course, has both 
advantages and disadvantages. It enabled the various 
UNFCCC parties, often with different views and agendas, to 
embrace a commonly accepted principle – one that accords 
with the Aristotelian notion of  comparative justice. Against 
Table 2: Emissions entitlement allocations for 2020 and 2050 
relative to 2001: total emissions by country
450ppm CO2 equivalent 550ppm CO2 equivalent
2020 over 
2001
2050 over 
2001
2020 over 
2001
2050 over 
2001
World 29% -50% 40% -13%
Developed -31% -86% -15% -76%
Australia -25% -90% -10% -80%
Canada -45% -89% -33% -80%
EU25 -30% -82% -14% -69%
Japan -41% -86% -27% -75%
USA -28% -89% -12% -81%
Developing 85% -14% 91% 50%
China 195% -45% 210% -4%
India 97% 90% 98% 230%
Source: Garnaut (2008b, p.18)
Table 3: Emissions entitlement allocations for 2020 and 2050 
relative to 2001 on a per capita basis
450ppm CO2 equivalent 550ppm CO2 equivalent
2020 over 
2001
2050 over 
2001
2020 over 
2001
2050 over 
2001
World 4% -66% 14% -41%
Developed -37% -88% -22% -79%
Australia -40% -95% -30% -90%
Canada -54% -92% -43% -86%
EU25 -33% -82% -17% -69%
Japan -40% -82% -25% -69%
USA -40% -92% -26% -86%
Developing -45% -46% 49% -5%
China 166% -50% 179% -13%
India 52% 22% 53% 112%
Source: Garnaut (2008b, p.19)
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this, it leaves for a future date the much more difficult task of  
giving this principle some real flesh and bones (i.e. agreeing 
on relevant material principles and applying them to the 
challenge at hand). On this reading, then, ‘comparability of  
efforts’ should not be thought of  as a distinct principle of  
distributive justice, such as equality, need or contribution, but 
rather as a broad, overarching principle that has the potential 
to embrace and balance a range of  competing material 
principles (and related policy initiatives).
Whether the inclusion of  comparability of  efforts 
represents a weakening of  the Kyoto framework in relation 
to the obligations of  developed countries remains to be 
seen. As noted, it is possible to interpret efforts as embracing 
either strenuous activity or the achievement of  results (or 
both). The parties thus have a choice ahead of  them, namely 
whether to focus on measures or indicators that relate to mere 
‘striving’ or whether instead to focus on those that relate to 
measurable results (whether in the form of  ‘inputs’ and/or 
of  ‘end-points’). The methodological and political difficulties 
associated with the former approach are likely, in practice, to 
ensure that primary attention is given to actual, time-bound 
results (e.g. specific emissions reductions against a base year). 
Equally, however, it is likely that the inclusion of  the phrase 
‘comparability of  efforts’ will help draw attention to the need 
to consider the overall packages of  measures being proposed 
for the post-2012 period, and their respective implications 
for different countries, rather than focusing on a single policy 
instrument or indicator of  progress. Total effort, in other words, 
is what matters, and potentially such effort could embrace 
domestic actions as well as enabling activities in other 
(especially developing) countries. Nevertheless, to the extent 
that some developed countries refuse to take on international 
‘commitments’ (i.e. responsibility targets) and only agree 
to nationally appropriate ‘actions’, there are bound to be 
problems deciding how these respective policies ought to be 
compared, whether they constitute a comparable effort and 
how compliance is to be enforced.
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Post-2012 Burden Sharing symposium, 
29 July 2008, Wellington, jointly hosted by the European Union Centres Network and the 
Institute of Policy Studies. I would like to thank Ben Gleisner, Lucas Kengmana, Martin 
Manning and Paule Stephenson for their help in preparing this paper.
2 But note that article 4, para 2(a) of the UNFCCC requires the parties to make ‘equitable and 
appropriate contributions’ to mitigate climate change.
3 Helme (2008) also deals with these issues, but since his treatment is similar but briefer 
than Schmidt et al. (2008) it is not discussed here.
4 Where comparable is taken to mean equal when relevant differences are controlled for.
5  Note that this terminology differs slightly from the terminology adopted in Schmidt et al. 
(2008). Most notably, Schmidt et al. refer to equal inputs as ‘equal efforts’, but since 
countries can make efforts towards outcomes as well, the term ‘equal inputs’ may be 
preferable.
6 Calculating the aggregate and per capita reductions required for individual countries for 2020 
is more problematic than for 2050 because the key parameters for 2050 (i.e. total global 
emissions and equal per capita emissions) are fixed, whereas for 2020 a number of different 
assumptions can be made about the speed of convergence, and a wider range of factors may 
affect the obligations of different countries (including the extent to which emissions have 
grown between 2001 and the commencement date for a post-2012 policy framework).
7 In 2001 New Zealand’s CO2 equivalent emissions were 73.1 million tonnes, the population 
was 3.9 million and per capita emissions were around 18.8 tonnes. Mid-range projections 
suggest that New Zealand’s population will reach just over 5 million by 2050. 
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